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112 1 intRoDuction
Globally, there is a massive shortfall in infrastructure investment. This is the result 
of a combination of several factors: (i) the continued rise in the global population; 
(ii) the ongoing process of urbanisation; (iii) a shortage of public spending on 
infrastructures due to the legacy effects of the Great Recession and the need to 
consolidate public budgets; and (iv) new challenges such as climate change and 
the IT revolution that require additional investments. The infrastructure gap is felt 
in developed countries as much as in emerging market and developing countries. 
In Europe, public investment at the municipal level has been hit particularly hard. 
In spite of substantial interest from the private sector, shortages of funding con-
tinue to be a major (though not the only) bottleneck on the path towards higher 
investment volumes. Using the example of Berlin, this article looks at some trends 
in urban infrastructure policies and discusses alternative sources of financing. 
2 the Role of cities 
Currently, more than 50% of the global population live in urban areas. By 2050, 
70% of the global population and 86% of the OECD population will live in cities 
(OECD, 2012). This is not only an unprecedented development in the history of 
humankind, but is also a reflection of the extent to which cities are a representa-
tion of modern forms of living.
Most large cities are growing fast – they are magnets. Berlin, for example, has 
gained around 50,000 new citizens annually since 2011. The attractiveness of 
cities extends to a multitude of different groups. Cities attract internationally 
mobile knowledge workers as well as economic migrants looking for a better life. 
Industries that thrive on human network effects – such as advertising, finance, 
software engineering and consulting – cluster in cities, and so do research and 
academic institutions that benefit from knowledge spillovers. 
Given their importance, cities will inevitably be the locus where the challenges for 
mankind manifest themselves distinctively and in stark form. At the same time, 
cities have characteristics that predestine them to providing solutions to these 
challenges. They are the natural locus for testing new technologies (“smart cities”) 
and for combating climate change (“green cities”). Similarly, as so often in the 
past, cities are not only the preferred destination for migrants, but, given their 
diversity, they are arguably also the best place for the integration of those migrants 
into society. More generally, cities appear to better at combatting poverty than 
rural areas (UN Habitat, 2011:13). 
 
Considering the unabated growth in the global population, cities, with their higher 
population density, offer unique chances for the optimization of resource use. The 
challenge here is to make cities more compact without reducing their liveability. 
The more compact a city lay-out the less degradation of farmland takes place 
because urban sprawl is reduced, and the less is the environmental burden of com-
muter traffic. Compact cities also increase the efficiency of network infrastruc-
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113Compact, efficient network infrastructures also make it easier to implement new 
technologies and to finance such changes. This holds true for private as well as 
public capital. For private capital, cities with their high numbers of potential users 
facilitate the investment case for large network investments as investment per user 
shrinks and revenues quickly reach critical mass. For public capital, too, per capita 
investment costs are lower. In addition, cities usually also have some authority 
over the financing mechanism associated with such investment projects – which is 
not only important for the financing of the project per se, but can also be used as 
a steering mechanism to influence user behaviour: Thus, e.g., toll schemes for city 
centres simultaneously raise financing and influence road usage. Also, looking 
beyond finance, cities usually have decisive authority over local infrastructure 
projects and are therefore well-placed to guide the course on the environmental 
and sustainable aspects of such projects (Merk et al., 2012:7). 
Yet, while cities are the answer to many economic, social, and environmental chal-
lenges, they are limited in their capacity to play this role: while cities are often 
economic powerhouses, they also tend to attract a disproportionally large share of 
economically and socially weaker citizens. This puts a marked burden on social 
spending. At the same time, continued migration into the cities requires substantial 
investment into expanding and upgrading public infrastructure – which, of course, 
comes on top of the normal requirement to continually renew the existing infra-
structure. All of these demands on cities’ budgets come at a time, when public 
sector infrastructure is already strained after the economic impact of the Great 
Recession after 2008, decades of lean government, and neoliberal thinking. 
3 Remunicipalisation 
As regards the latter, there has been a substantial shift of opinion in recent years 
in Germany. After a long period during which privatisation of public-sector enti-
ties was de rigueur, municipalities and cities have rediscovered their interest in 
owning companies providing public infrastructure.
The driving force for this development has been a substantial disenchantment with 
the privatisation of these services. Instead of delivering better services and lower 
prices, privatised general public service companies have often offered low service 
quality, have neglected investment, and have misused their monopoly positions. 
The latter has been particularly problematic in the case of network industries such 
as energy distribution, water supply and sewage, which have the characteristic of 
a natural monopoly and are therefore particularly prone to the exploitation of 
monopoly power (Höffler, 2013:72-73). Regulation, which was expected to keep 
these potential downsides of privatisation in check, has often proved to be too 
weak or inadequate, or has been captured by private interests. 
At the same time, over recent years, regional and municipal governments have 
often improved their administrative capacity, introduced modern management 
techniques and increased the efficiency of public service provision. They are 
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114 and efficiency of private sector companies in the supply of such services. In addi-
tion, municipal and regional governments have realised that many of the public 
policy objectives such as fighting climate change can be mastered more effec-
tively if local governments do not only regulate but are actually the owners of the 
means of production or distribution (Höffler, 2013:76-77). 
Against this background, in Berlin, too, the city government has been active on 
this front: 
 –  The public housing associations are increasing their housing stock – from 
300,000 apartments a few years ago to 400,000 in 2025.
 –  The water supply is state-owned again. We repurchased the “Berliner Wasser-
betriebe”, since then running the company each year with a surplus and at 
the same time increasing investment significantly. 
 –  We founded a new municipal utility for energy, competing for the conces-
sion to distribute electricity and gas, and another unit to increase the speed 
of de-carbonisation. 
Even before these moves, Berlin had already been a sizeable economic actor in its 
own right. The city is the (majority) owner of more than 50 companies with a 
combined turnover of EUR 8.1bn, an equity of EUR 10.1bn, EUR 54bn in total 
assets and employing 50,700 people (on an FTE basis). In 2016, these companies 
turned in a profit of EUR 708m and invested more than EUR 2bn (Senatsverwal-
tung für Finanzen, 2017). For comparison: investment from the city’s budget 
directly amounted to EUR 1.7bn. The city government’s objective is to raise both 
to a level of EUR 2.2bn.1 
4 financial situation of municipalities in GeRmany
A precondition for a higher level of economic activity by communities is financial 
soundness. But the budgetary room for public investments is within tight limits 
for most cities.
While the financial situation of municipalities has, on the back of a benign overall 
economic environment and higher employment levels in particular, improved con-
siderably in recent years in line with the improved fiscal situation of the public sec-
tor in Germany in general, the financial status of many municipalities continues to 
be precarious. Overall, Germany’s municipalities have posted a solid financial sur-
plus of more than EUR 4bn in 2016 and EUR 9.7bn in 2017 (Deutscher Städtetag, 
2017:5; Destatis, 2018). But many municipalities and even some of the Länder 
(states) face structural deficits. Problems are concentrated in those municipalities 
that suffer from high unemployment, negative demographics, and high exposure to 
social problems with a large share of dependent citizens. Thus, financial constraints 
and indebtedness of municipalities are concentrated in parts of North Rhine-West-
phalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, and large parts of Eastern Germany.
1 This involves some double counting, as part of the investment by firms is re-financed by apportionments 
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115Many of these municipalities have resorted to using short-term credit lines to cov-
er structural deficits exposing them to a severe interest risk as well as debt prob-
lem. If their finances improve, financially weak municipalities will, therefore, 
tend to reduce their debt rather than expand investment, even in the full knowl-
edge that this will impede their long-term growth opportunities. Already today, 
however, the contrast in investment levels between municipalities is indeed stark: 
In 2016, e.g., physical investment of Bavarian municipalities stood at EUR 517 
per capita, whereas those in North Rhine-Westphalia clocked only EUR 196. 
More generally, municipalities in the former West Germany recorded per capita 
investment of EUR 327, those in the former East Germany EUR 235 (Deutscher 
Städtetag, 2017:17; Destatis, 2018). A structurally similar pattern has been evident 
for at least a decade. This will aggravate the divergence between stronger and 
weaker municipalities. It is therefore advisable that, when the national or the fed-
eral-state (Länder) level advances funds for investment purposes to the municipal 
level, these funds are being tied to specific purposes ensuring that they actually 
flow into investments.
Overall, between 1991 and 2013, within 12 years, the proportion of investments 
in the overall budget of municipalities was halved and totalled only 10% at the end 
of the period. Closer analysis reveals that this is the result of several factors: first, 
some reduction is a natural corollary of the phasing-out of the post-unification 
boom. As the infrastructure in Eastern Germany was gradually brought up to 
Western standards over the 1990s and early 2000s, investment outlays could be 
reduced. Second, the steady expansion of social spending, which has expanded in 
economically good as well as in bad times, has eclipsed investment spending. 
Thirdly, highly indebted municipalities are legally obliged to bring their finances 
back into order and are closely supervised on the ensuing consolidation path. As 
investment spending is a “soft target” in budget consolidation, it is usually hit 
disproportionally when municipalities try to rebalance their budgets.
While public investment patterns vary across European countries, the financial 
weakness of the municipalities is particularly grave as most of the investment 
takes place at that level. According to the EIB, roughly 50% of public infrastruc-
ture investment takes place at the municipal level. Against this background it is a 
matter of concern that more than a third of municipalities report that investment 
over the last five years has been below needs (EIB, 2017:12). 
5 constitutional Debt bRaKe
In Germany, efforts to push up investment levels quickly are hindered not only by 
financial and administrative but also by institutional constraints. In 2009, the fed-
eral level and the Länder decided to change Germany’s constitution (the Basic 
Law) by adding a new clause that requires the Federal Republic and the Länder to 
balance their budgets.2 In principle, budgets will henceforth have to be balanced 
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116 without the assumption of new debt. Unlike earlier incarnations of debt brake 
mechanisms the new debt brake will no longer distinguish between consumption 
spending and investment spending; both types of expenditures will have to be 
financed out of current revenues.3 
After a long transition period, this provision will take full effect in 2020. The debt 
brake marks a substantial break with the past and will require a fundamentally 
changed attitude towards and new techniques for budget policies, in general, and 
the financing of public services and infrastructures, in particular. 
Unlike the national and the federal-state (Länder) levels, German municipalities 
are not covered by the constitutional debt brake. In principle, therefore, they will 
still be able to finance investment by issuing new debt even after 2020, subject to 
their creditworthiness still being intact, of course.4 It should also be noted, though, 
that municipalities may be affected indirectly by the debt brake if their respective 
Land is forced, in order to balance its own books, to reduce its financial alloca-
tions to the municipal level. 
However, the three German city-Länder (Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen) fully fall 
under the debt brake provisions. For them, financing investment after 2020 will 
become more challenging and will inevitably require that all available funding 
sources will be used. For some time now, this has led to an active search for 
financing models beyond traditional debt finance. 
6 alteRnative financinG moDels
Looking at the possible alternatives, the following options to improve the finan-
cial situation of cities are available: increase of tax income, improvement of tax 
collection, regrouping budget allocations from consumption to investment, use of 
budget surpluses, user-based financing, mobilising private funding and external 
funds (inter alia EU funds, such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments 
– EFSI). They are, of course, not mutually exclusive, but should be used in sensi-
ble combinations to increase public-sector investment. When choosing, the choice 
made by any given city will depend, inter alia, on the overall financial situation of 
the city, the project to be financed, and the sophistication of financial markets. 
6.1 incReasinG taX income
Higher tax revenues are the most obvious choice to finance an increase in the 
volume of public investment. Higher tax revenues can, of course, be the result of 
either higher growth and employment or increases in tax rates. Fortunately, in 
Germany and in Berlin, tax revenues have increased substantially over the recent 
3 Previously, the federal level as well as many Länder had constitutional provisions, which allowed govern-
ments to run deficits up to a maximum volume that was equivalent to the volume of investment. However, 
such rules were frequently evaded by flexible and imprecise definitions of what constitutes public investment. 
4 Incidentally, the fact that municipalities are not covered by the debt-brake provision may actually induce 
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117years on the back of the benign macroeconomic environment without any need to 
resort to changes in the tax-code.5 Between 2010 and 2017 total tax revenues at 
the federal, Länder and municipal level rose from EUR 530.6bn to an estimated 
EUR 734.5bn (+38%). Total tax revenues are projected to increase to EUR 858bn 
by 2021 (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2017:21), providing ample fiscal space for 
public sector investment if funds are allocated accordingly. 
However, increased tax revenues are obviously not available exclusively for high-
er investment. There are other substantial demands for spending on the budget, 
which must also be met. Apart from the usual drift in spending, which is driven by 
higher wage demands by public sector employees and inflation in general, social 
spending in particular is increasing in spite of the benign conditions in labour 
markets in Germany. The widening of income inequality and the increase in the 
number of precarious work contracts are probably to blame for this. In addition, 
additional expenditures for the admission and integration of refugees constitute a 
considerable demand on public funds, which amounts to roughly EUR 1bn (in 
2016, projected to be less in the following years) in the case of Berlin alone. 
6.2 impRovinG taX collection
The Panama Papers and other leaks have, once again, revealed the extent of inter-
national tax avoidance. Zucman (2014:56), e.g., estimates that tax evasion results 
in lost tax revenues on private wealth of EUR 130bn annually. The publication of 
such evidence comes at a time, when public opinion towards tax avoidance and 
tax evasion appears to be changing. They are no longer considered trivial offenc-
es, but instead are regarded as unfair behaviour that shows a lack of solidarity with 
the community at large. Tax intake that the state is denied is money that is missing 
to finance public services – and this gap is felt by the citizens on a daily basis.
Considerable efforts are being made, especially at the level of the OECD and at 
EU level, to stamp out the most egregious forms of tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
The OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) aims at reducing the ability 
of firms to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Similarly, the EU employs a “name 
and shame” approach to pillory non-cooperative tax havens. While these efforts 
are laudable as much as overdue, it is obvious that they will not result in a substan-
tial increase in tax revenues in the short-term. They are therefore unlikely to be a 
major funding source for investments any time soon. 
6.3 alteRinG composition of buDGet
The budget consolidation in the past few years – especially at the level of the fed-
eral states and municipalities – was to the detriment of investments. As the EIB 
5 Actually, the fact that tax rates were not lowered in spite of the strong growth in tax revenues contributed to 
the strong rise in tax intake, of course. The reluctance to lower taxes probably is a positive side effect of the 
debt brake as it discourages governments to risk revenues. Even in the ongoing coalition negotiations at the 
federal level plans for potential tax reductions were and are strictly limited to a volume which would not com-
promise the objective of a balanced budget. Deficit-enhancing tax reforms such as the one currently designed 
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118 (2017:11) notes: “Infrastructure investment has been hit by fiscal consolidation 
that has been biased against capital expenditure, with prioritisation given to cur-
rent expenditure such as social transfers.” The reason is political: scaling back 
investments is – at least in the short term – easier to pull through politically than 
social spending, as the effects are not felt immediately by the citizens. 
However, if such a strategy is pursued over an extended period (such as in the 
years of fiscal consolidation following the public debt crisis in Europe, starting in 
2011), public infrastructure will start to deteriorate markedly. Today, the public is 
much more aware that such neglect is harmful. Keeping the state lean may be a 
desirable objective – starving the state certainly is not, especially not for the poor-
er members of society that do not have access to privately funded alternatives, 
such as private schools, gated communities, and helicopters. 
Still, there is a limit to shifting funds within budgets in favour of a greater share 
of investment: consumptive expenditure is to a large extent legally prescribed and, 
hence, cannot be scaled back without politically difficult legal changes (if at all). 
Similarly, expenses for personnel cannot be reduced in the short term and with 
increasing public services this is not even desirable.
6.4 use of buDGet suRpluses
The sound condition of public budgets in Germany has sparked an intensive and 
controversial debate on how the resulting budget surpluses should be used. From 
an economic point of view, the starting point for any deliberation should be the 
recognition that unplanned budget surpluses are the result of unexpected higher 
revenues or lower expenditure than planned. The unexpected nature of these two 
sources suggests that such surpluses tend to be of a transitory nature. This, in turn, 
suggests that they should not be used to finance permanent expenditures. 
If this logic is accepted, it follows that budget surpluses should, to the extent that 
they are not used to retire existing debt, be used for discretionary, additional 
investment purposes rather than for an increase of public consumption.6 By doing 
so, the investment level can be re-adjusted should there be no surplus in the 
following year. Moreover, such a rule is also economically justified in light of the 
aforementioned fact that investment spending is usually the first victim in times of 
unexpected budget shortfalls. 
Incidentally, Berlin is following such a strategy: in 2014, the city passed a law 
stipulating that budget surpluses be allocated, at the parliament’s discretion and 
subject to the obligations Berlin has for consolidating its budget, to additional 
investments and the retirement of existing debt. In addition, a reserve fund (“sus-
tainability fund”) has been established and filled with a target volume of 1% of 
6 Incidentally, this has also been one of the recommendations by the Expert Group on Strengthening Invest-
ment in Germany (the so-called Fratzscher-Group) that was set up by the Federal Ministry for Economic 












































42 (2) 111-124 (2018)
119total budget volume (currently EUR 290m). This fund is designed to serve as a 
reserve for the years after 2020 to cover unexpected shortfalls in tax revenues dur-
ing a recession. To illustrate: in 2016, out of the total budget surplus of ca EUR 
1.3bn, EUR 870m was allocated to the investment fund, EUR 137m went into the 
retirement of legacy debt, and EUR 290m was put into the sustainability fund. 
6.5 useR-financeD moDels
As yet another financing mechanism, cities can impose user fees on their public 
services. User fees actually serve two purposes simultaneously: (i) they provide 
funds to finance those services, (ii) they can be used to steer the behaviour of 
(potential) users. 
Cities have some discretion over the design of user fees. Specifically, these can be 
fine-tuned to achieve desired policy-outcomes. Thus, e.g., congestion charges, 
variable parking fees and differentiated property taxes can exert considerable 
influence over transport modes, user behaviour and land use. 
Moreover, user fees and local taxes or charges can be combined effectively to 
achieve the desired outcomes. User charges on road congestion, for example, are 
likely to be more effective when combined with attractive public transport ser-
vices and prices (Hammer, 2011:76). Charges and taxes can then be used either to 
finance investments in public transport services or to subsidise user fees for such 
services. 
Having said this, a differentiation needs to be made between models in which user 
fees are cost-covering and those where this is not the case. Full cost recovery can 
be found in the areas of telecommunication, energy (pipelines, electricity), but 
also with fairs, water supply and sewage. In those cases, debt financing is often a 
possibility as a complementary source of funds. 
In contrast, user fees only partially cover costs in areas such as urban public trans-
port, theatres, and operas. While coverage rates vary, usually user fees only cover 
current operating costs, but do not cover depreciation and investments. For 
instance, Berlin’s public transport company, the BVG, had a turnover of EUR 
672m, which covered personnel costs (EUR 600m), but did not cover other oper-
ating costs (EUR 370m), or interest payments (more than EUR 36m), or deprecia-
tion (EUR 212m). 
In those cases, cities cover shortfalls either by cross-subsidising public sector ser-
vices within a holding structure (typically, profits made by water companies are 
used to subsidise public transport7) or allocate funds from the general budget to 
the transport company (in Berlin’s case ca EUR 500m p.a.). 
7 As Höffler (2013:74) argues, such a cross-subsidy can actually is actually an efficient pricing model accord-
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120 case study: berlin’s bvG
The BVG is facing huge challenges in the coming years. While on the 
one hand, the number of inhabitants and user numbers are rising mark-
edly, BVG’s fleet of underground vehicles is on average 24 to 26 years 
old. The renewal and expansion of the underground wagon fleet will cost 
around EUR 3.1bn, an investment that will need to be recouped over the 
next 35 years. The BVG itself will invest into the fleet, but will leave the 
financing arrangement to a finance company. This company will be a 
fully owned subsidiary of BVG. It will be responsible for attracting 
external capital for the necessary investment. 
6.6 mobilisinG pRivate capital8
Recently, cities have also been highly successful in mobilising private capital. For 
private investors, investment in cities carry distinct advantages. Risks and oppor-
tunities of such investments are easier to predict than in rural areas, a critical mass 
of users is achieved more easily and contracts can be negotiated with a single 
administration rather than multiple actors. Cities, especially well-known global 
cities, also hold the prospect of being well-advertised show-cases where new tech-
nologies or financing structures can be put on display for a world-wide audience 
by technology companies and financiers.
In addition, in times of sustained low interest rates on the financial markets private 
investors are greatly interested in infrastructure investment. In these circumstanc-
es, insurance companies, pension funds, and the like are interested in investments 
with stable and predictable returns. Infrastructure investments are also attractive 
as a means of portfolio diversification as the correlation of returns is lower than 
for other asset classes. Finally, the asset class provides a hedge against inflation, 
as user fees and/or concession arrangements are usually linked to inflation rates 
(WEF, 2014:7). 
In spite of this, however, privately funded infrastructure remains the exception 
rather than the rule: on the one hand, many private investors shy away from such 
investments as the framework conditions are not reliable enough (WEF, 2014:11). 
Regulations are often changed ex post, invalidating any ex ante calculation on the 
viability and profitability of such an investment (Laboul and della Croce, 2014:14).
On the other hand, there are reservations from the public side: as mentioned 
before, experiences with the privatisation of public infrastructure, especially when 
it comes to municipal services, are mixed. The public mood is leaning towards 
remunicipalisation. 
8 For reasons of brevity, “private capital” is used here as a catch-all for a diverse group of private capital, 
which encompasses, inter alia pension funds, insurance companies, family offices, and endowments. All of 
these have their specific characteristics which leads them to favour different combinations of debt and equity 
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121This also holds true for public-private partnerships, or PPPs. In principle, these 
can be a useful instrument to finance public infrastructures, especially under the 
conditions of tight budgets. According to Hammer et al. (2011:120), PPPs are 
mostly used for financing transport infrastructure and to a slightly lesser extent 
water (30%) and buildings (21%). PPPs can be useful, but only under certain con-
ditions. But as the OECD notes: “There is, however, no indication that PPPs 
would be better suited to achieve green growth goals than traditional procure-
ment” (Hammer et al., 2011).9 Specifically, PPPs are critical when they are only 
chosen because the implicit debt obligation of the state incurred in the context of 
a PPP project does not appear on the cities’ balance sheet and is therefore irrele-
vant for debt brake mechanisms. 
Even if these reservations were not existent, private financing would not be suit-
able for all public infrastructure. Many areas, for example schools, are not at all 
attractive for private investors, and hence, this financing mechanism is not avail-
able for such projects. 
6.7 eXteRnal financinG/eu funDs
Funding from the European level has long been an important element in the 
financing of public infrastructure in EU member states. Two major sources have 
been the EU structural and cohesion funds for regions with below average p.c. 
incomes and EIB loans. More recently, the spectrum of potential sources availa-
ble has been enriched by EFSI, which is part of the so-called Juncker Plan to 
increase the level of investment in post-crisis Europe.10 Generally, the Juncker 
Plan is laudable and it is an important signal on the political priorities of the 
European Commission. 
The Juncker Plan recognises the need of state measures to enhance investments; it 
is needless to say that recognising the important role that the state has to play has 
not always been part of the Commission’s philosophy. Furthermore, the Juncker 
Plan constitutes progress as it is a comprehensive plan; it does not only provide a 
financing mechanism (EFSI), but also puts emphasis on (i) improving the frame-
work for investments by means of appropriate regulation and structural reforms, 
(ii) advisory services on how to run complex investment projects, and (iii) devel-
oping a project pipeline that not only prioritises projects, but also makes them 
publicly known so that private investors can express their interest. 
The greatest value of EFSI lies in the fact that it aims at closing a gap in the financ-
ing spectrum that cannot be covered through the private capital market: EFSI is 
designed to focus on those kinds of investments that are likely to cover their costs, 
9 There is a heated debate in Germany currently on the use of PPP to finance the building of highways. The 
National Court of Auditors strongly rejects the use of PPP for this purpose arguing that this form of financ-
ing is too expensive. 
10 The Juncker-Plan was first presented by the European Commission (2014) in November 2014, and enacted 
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122 including cost of capital, but which are either too risky or too low-yielding to 
attract private capital.11
It should be noted that by focussing on these kinds of projects, EFSI can lose 
money on individual projects. However, this is part of its conceptual design and 
should not be a cause for concern. Conceptually, EFSI is equivalent to a private 
equity fund and, hence, should not be expected to make a profit out of every 
investment, but to be profitable over its entire portfolio. Characterising EFSI as a 
private equity fund also implies, by the way, that the capital of EFSI should be 
increased regularly to keep its volume relative to the GDP on the same level.
7 conclusions
The need for investment is not in doubt. Public investments are a catalyst for sus-
tained and sustainable growth. However, to reap the benefits of a strong public 
sector infrastructure, cities need to invest with a long-term perspective and in a 
continuous manner. Arguably, continuity in public-sector investment that avoids 
boom-and-bust cycles is even more important than the actual level of investment. 
The answer to the question of how to finance this investment is, however, less 
clear cut and has so far been given far less weight in discussions. If we compare 
the needs for investment with the capacity of the potential sources discussed 
above, one thing becomes clear: a mix of financing sources is needed to provide a 
steady stream of public sector investment. Each city needs to find its own mix, 
preferably one with the least negative trade-offs in terms of growth.
The public sector must also meet stronger requirements than the private sector. 
The conduct of business must be transparent, and a responsible use of taxpayers’ 
money must be at the core of public enterprises. All public enterprises should 
produce positive returns when subsidies are paid, and the level of these subsidies 
must, of course, be defined ex ante so that companies have an incentive to improve 
their financial performance and produce positive results. Public enterprises also 
should not be capitalised with more equity than is needed.
Incidentally, meeting such high standards also protects public enterprises against 
debates on their privatisation. Providing high quality and efficient services leads 
to a high level of satisfaction on the part of citizens – and this satisfaction offers 
the best protection against the provision of such services by public enterprises 
being questioned. 
11 Incidentally, with respect to public-sector projects, it is a shame that this important group of low return 
investment projects (a typical example would be projects to increase energy-efficiency) were added to the 
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